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Introduction
Any economy is characterized by several different patterns of industrial relations (IR)
and human resource (HR) practices at the level of the workplace. Often, the patterns of IR/HR
practices of firms differ based on the nature of the industry, the nature of technology and
production methods used, the specific economic circumstances facing firms, and in some cases
the IR/HR philosophy of key individuals. Patterns of IR/HR practices also differ based on
economic sectors, with IR/HR practices in the service sector showing differences with patterns
in the manufacturing sector.
In the context of the rapidly developing nations of Southeast Asia where labor human
resource policies and practices have been identified as a critical element in their industrial
success, (World Bank Research Report 1993), the national industrialization strategy has been
shown to influence national level industrial relations and human resource practices to a
considerable extent (1994a, 1994b). In this paper, I argue that different industrialization
strategies also create distinct patterns of IR/HR practices at the level of the workplace, patterns
that transcend sector, industrial, and firm level boundaries.
This argument is evaluated in Malaysia and the Philippines, which have followed an
import substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy and an export oriented industrialization (EOI)
strategy, common to several fast developing Asian countries (Kuruvilla 1994). The EOI strategy
can be further subdivided into a first stage EOI based on the exports of cheap manufactured
goods where the competitive advantage is cheap labor, while the second stage is based on
higher value added manufactures using more highly skilled labor. Each industrialization strategy
has emphasized the growth of certain types of industries and firms through various financial
incentives and regulatory mechanisms, resulting in the growth of two different sectors in the
economy, an inward looking ISI sector, and an outward looking EOI sector. If the argument is to
be substantiated, the patterns of workplace IR/HR practices in these two sectors must be
different, irrespective of the types of industries and firms in these sectors.
To evaluate this argument, I use a research design consisting of systematic pair-wise
comparisons, using case studies of firms in banking, paint manufacturing, electronics, electrical,
and tool and die making industries. Pair-wise comparisons offer the potential for isolating and
clarifying similarities and differences across industrial relations systems, and in this paper, these
comparisons are made at several levels. First, comparisons of workplace level IR/HR practices
are made between the ISI and EOI sectors in each economy to evaluate the argument whether
industrialization strategies have resulted in different patterns. Second, comparisons of ISI sector
and EOI sectors are done across the two countries to evaluate whether the pattern of
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differences found between ISI and EOI regimes is stable and consistent across both countries,
i.e. are the results broadly generalizable?. For the argument to hold true, IR/HR practices in the
ISI sector in both countries ought to be similar, while the patterns of IR/HR practices in the EOI
sectors in both economies ought to be different from the ISI, but also different across the two
countries given that they follow different EOI strategies (Malaysia follows a more advanced EOI
strategy while the Philippines follows a simple EOI strategy based on low costs) .
Finally, the cases also permit comparisons of firms in specific industries across both
sector and countries. This multiple level of comparisons include both comparison strategies of
"most similar" and "most different" systems designs (Przeworski 1987) used in comparative
political science, although the application of this technique to comparative industrial relations
research is relatively rarei .
INDUSTRIALIZATION STRATEGIES
As Kuruvilla (1994a, 1994b) has suggested, the industrialization strategies followed by
Malaysia and the Philippines is consistent with the prevailing Southeast Asian stage-wise model
consisting of three stages; an initial import substitution industrialization (ISI) stage, followed by a
low cost export oriented industrialization (EOI) stage that capitalizes on the advantage of cheap
labor, and then by more advanced EOI stage based on the exports of more skill intensive and
capital goods.ii
Both Malaysia and Philippines adopted an ISI strategy in the 1950s. Given their inability
to sustain a foreign exchange intensive import dependent ISI regime, both countries shifted to
EOI. In Malaysia, this shift occurred in the 1970s, with the enactment of state policies to attract
foreign investment in the electronics sector. A combination of cheap and compliant labor along
with a considerable range of financial, fiscal, regulatory and infr structural incentives resulted in
the attraction of foreign capital in the electronics and electrical goods sectors of the economy
(see Salih, Young, and Rajah 1988, Spinanger 1986). In the late 1980s, given the influence of
rapid technological change, globalization of products and markets, increased competition from
other 1 ow cost Asian exporters, and a labor shortage arising from the inflow of foreign firms,
the government articulated a more advanced EOI strategy focusing on attraction of firms
exporting higher value added manufactures in electronics and electricals, based on more skilled
labor (Rajah 1993, Kuruvilla 1994).
In the case of the Philippines, repeated foreign exchange crises in the 1960s led the
World Bank to recommend the adoption of EOI strategies consequent to its stabilization loans to
the country. However, given the disagreement between local capitalists in the imports sector
and those who profited from exports, a full scale EOI program was not implemented until the
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martial law period in 1972 (Bello and Verzola 1993). The EOI program was intensified under the
World Bank sponsored structural adjustment in 1983 (see Villegas 1988, Ofreneo 1994 for a
more specific discussion of the policies enacted to boost exports), and has continued since then
under the Aquino and Ramos administrations. While the Philippines is in the stage of export
orientation characterized by the export of low cost labor intensive manufactures for export
financed by foreign investment, Malaysia, has is transforming from the low cost EOI stage to a
more advanced EOI characterized by the exports of more technology intensive products,
coupled with some level of industrial deepening.
The results of the adoption of EOI regimes can be seen in three key indicators in both
economies, listed in Table 1. First in both economies, the relative share of industry in GDP has
increased since the 1960s, although the increase has been much sharper in Malaysia than in
the Philippines. Second, in both countries, the contribution of exports to total GDP has
increased steadily, while the contribution of manufacturing exports to total exports in both
countries has increased dramatically. The success of the EOI regime is also evident in the
consistently high economic growth rates in Malaysia, while economic growth rates in the
Philippines have been less impressive, showing both sharp rises and declines.
-Insert Table 1 about here-
The industrialization strategies have created in both economies two distinct economic
sectors, the import substitution sector and the export oriented sector. Although it is difficult to
estimate the relative size of these two sectors in the economy given the absence of any
systematic data collection by the governments, the sectors operate under different rules and are
characterized by different industries and firms.
The export sectors in both economies are typically characterized by foreign
multinationals and firms producing manufactured goods, primarily in the electrical and electronic
industries, but also in small manufactures and textiles. Given that government policy
encourages exports, these firms are the target of numerous financial, fiscal, and regulatory
incentives, such as the provision of cheap land and utilities, exemption from corporate taxes,
exemptions from labor legislation, and several developmental and infrastructural rebates.
Although the policies in both countries offer a similar package of benefits to foreign investors,
one key difference is that Malaysia has restructured its investment incentives since 1988 to
attract higher technology and skill incentive firms, with specific incentives for setting up
advanced research and development facilities. In addition, Malaysia has also restructured its
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education sector and enacted policies for skills development to provide the highly skilled
manpower that higher technology industries require. In both countries, firms in the EOI sector
are foreign owned, competing in international markets, with their economic circumstances
depending largely on international market conditions. Most foreign firms export 100% of their
production, and in both countries, have relatively little local linkages, with the exception of
subcontracting arrangements. The EOI sector is typically smaller than the ISI sector, although it
is growing at a more rapid pace, and estimates suggest that this sector may account for 20-25%
of employment in both economies.
The ISI sector on the other hand, is larger, and typically consists of large state and
private owned industries operating in core sectors such as utilities, transportation,
communications, airlines, as well as in the manufacture of consumer and industrial goods.
These industries are largely protected from foreign competition in both countries, although
exposed to some degree of domestic competition. Several of them are monopolistic firms
owned and operated by the government in both countries. The economic conditions of these
industries are largely locally determined, with international market forces having a relatively
smaller impact. In the Philippines, the ISI sector has witnessed severe declines in the last
decade, given government policies that support an export oriented regime-- for example-- the
several devaluations in the Philippine peso during the 1980s raised the costs of foreign
exchange needed for ISI industries to import technology needed for production, and the decade
of the 1980s witnessed a closure of more than 7000 ISI firms, resulting in a serious
deindustrialization of this sector (Villegas 1988). In Malaysia, however, the ISI sector has also
grown as a result of government policies encouraging industrial deepening to accompany the
dramatic export performance. The case studies that follow are drawn from both ISI and EOI
sectors in both economies, permitting both a within country and between country sector wise
comparison of IR/HR practices.
CASE STUDIES OF FIRMS IN MALAYSIA AND PHILIPPINES
The cases are drawn from a variety of industries in each sector economic sector. In the
ISI Sector, domestically owned firms in the banking and paint manufacturing industries were
chosen in both economies to examine patterns in both blue collar and white collar industries. In
the EOI sector, firms from industries such as electronics, tool and die making, and banking were
chosen. Given the predominance of electronic firms in the EOI sectors of both countries,
my sample is also biased towards electronics firms. The cases are discussed in more detail
below. The IR/HR practices are also summarized in Tables 2 and 3.
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ISI Sector firms in Philippines
DUTCH BOY PAINTS : Dutch Boy Paints, the largest manufacturer of commercial and industrial
paints in the Philippines, is a 40 year old company currently owned by a local consortia and
Jensen and Nicholson, an international paint manufacturer, with technical collaborations with
leading paint companies such as Ameron (USA), Stollack (Austria) and Standox (Germany).
Employing about 324 workers in its factory in Makati, Manila, it produces industrial and domestic
paints for the Filipino market. The oldest paint manufacturer in the country, it enjoys a reputation
for technological leadership and high quality paints.
The market for industrial and decorative paints (which accounts for 80% of their
production) is highly price sensitive. There are over 70 competitors, mostly smaller
manufacturers, with lower overheads competing on the basis of price at the low end of the
market, although two bigger firms, Boysen paints (established 1974) and Charter Chemicals
(established 1976) are competitors (The Paint Authority, 1993). Dutch Boy's competitive
strategy has always been predicated on its reputation for quality, rather than on price. This
focus has continued even through the increased competition in a price sensitive environment of
the 1980s, resulting in some losses in market share in recent years. For example, from a high
market share of 60% in 1960s, Dutch Boy accounts currently for 20% of the market. Boysen
paints, a Chinese owned firm whose competitive strategy focuses on price, has increased its
market share from 0 in 1974 to 40% in 1993. In terms of profitability, Boysen reports profits of
20% on sales, while the figures for Dutchboy are less impressive, at 2.5% of total sales of Peso
705 million. Boysen paints annual turnover of pesos 1.2 billion is accomplished with only 175
employees roughly one half of Dutchboy's labor force. In addition, delivery times (time between
order and delivery), a critical indicator of efficiency, in Bo sen is 1 hour, while 4.5 hours in the
case of Dutch Boy. Accounts receivables, another important indicator of a firms financial
strength, is 120 days in Boysen, while only 60 days in Dutch Boy.
Dutch Boy Paints' complacency in its business strategy is reflected in its human
resource practices as well. Given the complex (1000 different product lines) continuous process
technology the company has made little effort to increase skills of workers or change work
organization practices over the last 40 years. Training is largely job specific, with little effort to
broaden workers skills and job classifications. The firms compensation strategy is based on a
market leadership principle, pays the best wages in the market, but is largely rigid, with fixed
pay scales and increments negotiated with the union, a variable bonus that is guaranteed to all
workers and with only 3% (out of total increases of 12% in 1992-93) based on merit. There are
no productivity linked or skill acquisition based incentives in the compensation system.
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The firm boasts of a long and collaborative relationship with the union, where
negotiations are carried out by the Company's President and the union leaders. The
negotiations are generally cordial, with the last long term agreement being signed in five 4 hour
sittings, which is extremely fast by Philippine standards. The approach to employment and
industrial relations is largely paternalistic. Dutch Boy prides itself on being a family oriented
company employing husbands and wives , and in some cases, even children in the firm. There
has never been a strike, and the grievance system has never been used even once since its
inception in 1960. In the words of the Personnel Manager "if the workers demands are genuine,
we agree to them". While 1/5th of the production requirements are met by overtime, during
periods of low production, the firms ability to be flexible is constrained by its no layoff policy.
Given the decreases in market share, the business strategy has been to emphasize
quality of both production and service, and to reduce costs by investing in a technologically
advanced equipment in a new factory that is being built in a lower cost location in the
Philippines. However, the company does not plan to alter its human resource practices in any
way in the new plant.
INTERBANK: Interbank was the 18th largest commercial bank in the Philippines, with over 55
branches. Formerly owned by American Express, it has recently agreed to merge with Union
Bank of the Philippines, making it one of the largest Filipino banks. Although the banking
industry was highly regulated, with certain banks operating in certain sectors, deregulation of
the industry in 1989 has created universal banks (u ibanks) that can operate throughout the
economy which has resulted in an explosion of new branches as bigger players get into rural
markets. For Interbank-Union Bank, deregulation presents a growth opportunity in an
increasingly competitive market. Interbank now has 1200 employees, of which 33 are
managers, 300 are junior officers, and the rest are rank and file, which includes the different
clerical positions as well as the indirect staff such as messengers, security officers and drivers.
The Bank's human resource policies and practices evidence some degree of
paternalism, although basic conditions are comparable to other banks given that the banking
industry is unionized in the Philippines. Its compensation strategy is predicated on being a
market leader, and the union suggests, based on salary levels, that it is the best paying
domestic bank. The compensation system is relatively straightforward, based on a salary scale
with increases in the scale discussed with the union. During the last bargaining round, the
agreement for a three year contract was a 25% wage increase during the first year, with lump
sum payments in the following two years. Employees are also paid 4 months wages as
bonuses, during the year (statutory, anniversary, Christmas, and mid year), although none of
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these payments are tied to productivity or performance, and few banks offer such a range of
guaranteed bonuses. Its benefits are also better than most other banks, and is the only bank
with paid paternity leave as well as assistance for funerals of relatives of employees.
In terms of work organization and training, the practices reflect a Tayloristic approach
that is consistent with policies of most domestic banking firms that were interviewed. The bank
does not have a policy of job rotation and skills development. Movement within the organization
can occur only vertically through promotions. The predominant type of training is to increase job
related skills. The average tenure is 9 years (for a fifteen year old bank), although the increase
in demand for tellers post deregulation in the Philippine banking industry is being felt with
turnover rates increasing to about 6-7% currently.
The bank's paternalistic human resource strategy is also due to the personnel
philosophy of the President (who claims that if people are treated well in terms of pay and
benefits, there will not be any problem. The bank has a no layoff policy, eschews overtime and
other flexibility enhancing mechanisms available to the industry such as subcontracting and
retrenchment. The banks response to the increasingly competitive environment has been to
increase automation rather than to decrease employment.
The company and the Interbank Corporation Bank Employees Union, have a cordial
collective bargaining relationship in a heavily unionized banking industry. The bargaining
relationship is about 10 years old, with three long term agreements having been entered into
without a strike. Labor Management relationships have steadily grown better through
institutional procedures such as formal labor management committees, and regular briefing
meetings with the union called 'situationers'. While the subjects discussed are mostly with
regard to issues of discipline and welfare, the company also informs the union of the broad
financial trends and performance of the bank. The union has specifically requested that it not be
drawn into the labor management committee, although it monitors the activities with a view to
making sure that subjects that fall under the bargaining domain are not discussed in the
committees. In addition, the union does not see the new emphasis on quality circles as a threat
to its existence. No significant bargaining regarding job assignments takes place, and since the
bank pays above the market wage, wage bargaining is relatively dispute free.
EOI Sector Firms in Philippines
UNIDEN: Japanese owned UNIDEN makes CB radios, web pagers, web scanners, satellite
receivers, and other electronic accessories in its Philippine operations for export to North
America and Australia. This case study is of one of their two plants, employing 4300 workers
and making printed circuit boards for use in various electronic products.
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UNIDEN is known as a supplier of cheap electronic products, positioned at the lower
end of the market. Their competitive strategy has focused on low costs, and their products such
as CB radios and answering machines are the cheapest in the U.S. market. Rising labor costs
in their factories in Taiwan, and S. Korea forced them to move operations in 1987 to lower cost
areas such (South China and the Philippines). Consistent with Japanese Pan Asia production
strategies common in other industries (see Kuruvilla and P g ucco 1994), design and product
development of electronic products are done in Japan, while marketing is done in individual
countries by local workforces.
Their human resource strategies tend to mirror the low cost business strategy of the
company. The plant employees primarily young women operatives between the ages of 18-22,
and who are paid 60% of the wages of male workers in the industry (Pineda Ofreneo 1988).
Material handling jobs are also performed mostly by women, although few women can be seen
in line leader or supervisory jobs.
Work organization is based on a Tayloristic assembly line principle. Each operator looks
after several machines in a production line, and line leaders and assistant line leaders are
responsible for material supply and inspection. Workers are not trained or allowed to attend to
machine breakdowns, which are left to engineering staff. The training is job specific, and done
on the job. The Personnel manager suggests that "it is not the policy of this company to have
multi skilled workers, and transfers across operations are only initiated where there is a vacancy
in one department or line and a surplus in the other. By and large, a worker in one department
and one line remains with the line until she gets promoted out of it or leaves".
UNIDEN's compensation strategy matches its low cost business strategy. Although the
personnel manager claims to be in the 75th percentile of compensation in the industry, my
comparison with other international electronics firms suggest a compensation strategy
suggestive of the market follower. Operators with at least two years experience are paid 165
pesos per 8 hours, which is only 7% above the minimum wage of 154 pesos per day in Metro
Manila, in contrast to the industry leader Motorola, whose average wages are approximately
25-40% higher than the minimum wage i n Metro Manila. In addition, the wage system is rigid,
based on a fixed scale, with guaranteed annual increments, no production incentives and no
merit related increases.
The company is nonunion. The company's personnel policies state that they prefer to
deal directly with their employees and not have "third parties such as unions interfering with the
relationship with their employees". UNIDEN has been the target of several organizing drives
since 1987. In 1988, the company successfully argued unfair labor practices (noncompliance of
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certification procedures) after a union victory in the representation elections. Following the
reinstatement of a suspended union activist in 1991 (after a series of wildcat strikes), a second
certification election was held. In this election over 10 different labor federations contested the
election, resulting in no union winning the required 30% of the vote. Although the company
believes that its employees do not want unions, only 20 percent of the workers voted for the
nonunion option. Interviews with workers however indicate that the company pursues active
union suppression strategies.
The primary method of increasing employment flexibility is through the use of contract
and casual labor in its indirect operations. At the current time, there were about 500 contract
workers in the plant, working jobs such as staff canteen, security and materials handling.
Contract workers are paid at the minimum wage. The relatively short tenure rates (average 2
years) and the high rates of labor turnover (30%) appear to be a consequence of UNIDEN's low
cost employment practices, suggests several workers.
There is relatively little new investment planned in this factory, despite the rapid change
in automation in the semiconductor industry. A significantly larger part of UNIDEN's investment
go to their factory in South China, where wages are lower, and there are relatively fewer labor
standards legislation. Additional investment in the Philippines is planned at a lower cost area
outside Metro Manila.
MOTOROLA : Motorola's Philippine operations commenced in 1979, involving the assembly and
testing of integrated circuits. The production technology is at the low end of semiconductor
manufacture, including wirebonding and molding, and testing, in contrast to Motorola's
Malaysian operations, which are considerably more advanced, including both wafer fabrication,
and some research and development. The plant employs about 2000 operators, and currently
produces 10 million IC's a week, and in peak periods can produce as much as 15 million IC's
per week. 100% of its production is exported back to Motorola in the U.S. Motorola is well
known in the electronics sector for its high quality products and innovations in production
organization and people involvement, and its human resource strategies in the Philippine
operations are consistent with the Motorola approach worldwide.
Work organization currently reflects MOTOROLA's worldwide system, with fully
automated production systems. The work allocation of an operator involves the monitoring of
automated production lines, mostly via computer terminals. All operatives are trained in
autonomous maintenance and trouble shooting, and autonomous maintenance has resulted in
reducing machine down times by 60% since it was introduced in 1991.
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This form of work organization is supported by two features, training and teamwork.
Training is comprehensively viewed, with employees exposed to skill training, production,
quality, maintenance and parts management, trouble shooting, as well as communication and
personality skills. Motorola's corporate policy ensures that every employee receives a minimum
of 40hrs of raining per year, in order to facilitate meeting the company's policy of multiskilling.
Under the multiskilling policy, each operative must know at least three jobs at the same
hierarchy and one job at the higher level. At any given time, each worker trainer (the highest job
in the worker hierarchy) will be training at least 10 workers, working on a schedule that covers
the entire workforce. From the employee's point of view, he or she can expect to learn one new
skill every six months until two years have elapsed, when he or she gets promoted to the next
level.
In terms of teamwork, Motorola uses both structured and autonomous teams. Structured
teams include straight line teams that are part of one production line and one department, as
well as interactive teams that are comprised of different people to solve different kinds of
problems. For example, in straightline teams in the wirebonding department, are comprised of
both horizontal teams (workers in different shifts) as well as vertical teams (workers in different
job hierarchies) including both the supervisor and ending with a material handler. The team
becomes an interdisciplinary team when engineers and technicians in quality assurance and
inspectors are added. Each team meets for one hour a week on production time, but also meets
outside the production time where they are paid overtime if the team leader feels that it is
necessary. More recently fully autonomous work teams have been introduced in some
departments, where the team takes full responsibility for recruitment, training, and production
management, and performance appraisal. The team has been successful in winning many
international Motorola competitions organized in the USA and have received prizes for two
consecutive years.
Employee involvement is further enhanced by a suggestion scheme which includes
small rewards (200 pesos) for accepted suggestions, and larger rewards after the
implementation of the suggestion. The number of suggestions have been increasing steadily,
from 322 (half implemented) in 1987 when the scheme was introduced to 1500 in 1992 and
1622 in 1993 (of which 1074 were proved to be valid and implementable, and of which 554 had
been implemented already).
Motorola's compensation strategy and performance appraisal systems are linked to the
concept of teamwork and multiskilling. In terms of compensation strategy, Motorola positions
itself at the top of the market in terms of wages and salaries, and their pay rates (and more
Nat’l Industrialization Strategies and IR/HR Practices                                                                                                    WP94-07
Page 12
importantly, benefits) are on average, 20% higher than market rates, with equal pay for males
and females. A significant benefit not found in other electronics companies is that Motorola pays
all the tuition expenses of employees who want to invest in education during their off hours.
The compensation system is flexible, with about 50% of earnings devoted to
performance and productivity, and this part may increase or decrease according to plant
performance. Wage increases are tied to both the cost of living as well as the performance of
the employee and the employee's department, based on the performance appraisal system.
95% of the factors involved in performance appraisal are objective in nature and records exist,
so it is easy to monitor. When workers do jobs at higher skill levels, they get an additional 15%
of pay for the time worked, and a performance linked mid year bonus based on plant output and
quality yield. An individual can increase his or her annual earnings by as much as 30% by extra
performance.
In terms of employment and flexibility, average turnover rates is less than 2%. Peaks
and lows in production are met by overtime and redeployment. In the 1985-86 recession in the
electronics industry, a program was developed in consultation with workers. Initially, they
schedules annual leave, then went onto single day layoffs, work haring and shorter workweeks.
Finally they started a voluntary retirement system with retrenchment compensation, three
months pay and a commitment to rehire. 300 workers accepted voluntary retirement of which
150 were rehired. The consultative manner in which this decision was taken has been much
talked about by the workers, given the massive layoffs at other electronics firms.
Motorola is not unionized. Apart from unsuccessful organizing drives in 1982 and 1984,
there have been no attempts to organize. Communications between management and workers
are highly structured, with policy stipulating that managers must spend two hours a week talking
with employees, and the grievance procedure has never been formally used. Although
Motorola's investment plans to open another factory in the Philippines, it has directed more of its
higher technology investment into Malaysia. Although Philippines has the advantage of
educated workers and there is a labor shortage in Malaysia, the poor quality of infrastructure
(transport, power, and communications) relative to Malaysia hampers expansion plans in the
Philippines.
CITIBANK:  Citibank employs 1000 employees and while its competitors in the domestic market
are other Philippine banks, in the foreign exchange sector, it is the largest and most profitable
foreign bank. Citibank has positioned itself as the one bank in the Philippines with the global
reach. Therefore, Citibank sells itself as an outward looking bank and hence, its business
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strategy and consequently human resource strategies are dependent on what happens
internationally rather than locally.
Consistent with its worldwide human resource practices, Citibank has multiskilling and
job rotation for all employees. Recruiting from the best schools in the Philippines at entry level,
the new recruits are generally trained OJT. However, they also attend a number of technical
courses such as trade financing, computer skills, and customer service seminars to enhance
their skills. For a teller position, where there are four job grades, the skills required for each job
grade is determined, and movement up job grades are based on such skill acquisition, although
there is a minimum time limit at each job grade. For example, a teller must have stayed at least
2 years at the level 9, the lowest teller level, before moving to level 10. However, for each level
10 that is mastered while at level 9, pay is increased.
While the bank follows a market follower compensation strategy (Citibank positions itself
at the bottom of the foreign banks and at 75% of the local banks), its range of non cash benefits
are amongst the best in the industry. The compensation system is tied substantially to the
acquisition of new skills, where a maximum of 10-25% of the salary increases are for skill
development. The rest of the compensation package is relatively fixed, but includes bonuses for
attendance and good performance. While the increases in salary levels are bargained with the
union, the job scales for each grade are not known to the union.
In terms of workplace flexibility, Citibank follows an aggressive policy of subcontracting.
As far as possible, all indirect jobs are contracted out. Currently, indirect jobs such as security,
messengers, janitors, and computer processing. Earlier, even librarians, computer processing
operatives and drivers jobs were also contracted out, but following a successful dispute raised
by the union, these jobs have been moved in -house. Currently, contracting out is still viewed as
essential to keeping payroll costs low, and most credit card operations, including processing of
applications, reference checks and liquidity checks are contracted out currently. Such
contracting out is consistent with Citibank practices in the U.S.
One recent innovation is the is the hiring of Chinese speaking clerks to develop the
Chinese side of the business given that the Filipino Chinese community is far more wealthier
and controls most of the trade and industry in the Philippines. Cit banks' employees have an
in-house union affiliated to the National Association of Bank Unions. The relationship, which
was conflictual in the early 1980s has become more cooperative recently, partly on account of
an institutionalized exchange of information once a month, and largely because of a festering
dispute regarding the use of contract labor for computer programming, driving and security
employees was decided in favor of the union by the labor courts. A formal labor management
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cooperation committee consistent with labor law exists, although the union has viewed the
institution of the committee with some degree of suspicion and has refused to participate
formally. The union is involved in the job evaluation committee, but their role is restricted to that
of monitoring rather than direct participation.
Matsushita Communications MCP:  MCP is a wholly owned subsidiary of Matsushita
Communication Industrial Company (Japan), Matsushita Electric Industrial Co (Japan) and
Matsushita Electrical Philippines Corporation (MEPCO), Philippines. MCP started its operations
in 1988 in the Philippines and produces floppy disk drives, electric condenser microphones,
hand free microphones, and closed circuit video cameras and monitors for export. MCP
accounts for over 2% of the Philippines total export earnings. We focus here on one of its
factories in Metro Manila, employing 2832 workers.
Consistent with the prevailing Japanese practice in the electronics industry in S.E. Asia
(see Salih et al. 1988), Matsushita does most of the research and development in Japan, its
medium end production in Malaysia, while the Philippines operations focus on low end
production. Production processes and work organization follow the Matsushita model in Japan.
Japanese managers spend five year stints as advisers in each department, and are responsible
for training and implementation of production techniques. All engineers are sent to Japan for
training. The chief executive officer is Japanese.
Although the production focuses on the assembly and testing of microphones, a
significant part of the assembly line has been automated and robotocized, although the extent is
limited compared to Matsushita's Malaysian operations. The assembly lines are mostly
automated with the workers primarily monitoring the output and clearing stoppages. In case of
major breakdowns, maintenance is done by engineering departments on request by the
supervisor. Automation and rationalization of production processes over the last five years have
contributed to dramatic increases in labor productivity, which is 2.71 times higher than it was in
1988.
The work is organized around the individual workers with specified job responsibilities
who are also part of teams. The team leader, who supervises about 10 people in a horizontal
team, reports to the supervisor, who supervises about 20 teams or 200 people. Within each sub
process (e.g., amplifier block, building diaphragms, or microphone assembly), different patterns
of job assignments are in evidence.
Training is largely done on the job by worker trainers, and the worker is then rotated
across all the jobs in the department. Promotions to line leader and worker trainer are based on
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skills acquired, and "soft" skills such as personal development and supervision are emphasized
at these levels. All workers are also now being trained in the use of robotic technology.
The compensation system is based on a simple salary scale, which begins at about
3900 pesos per month (more than double the minimum wage of 1875 pesos per month). Wage
increases are based on regular increments in the scale with one mid year bonus that is based
on overall firm performance. The compensation is based on a detailed job classification system
that is organized around knowledge, skills, both mental and physical, with different weights for
different jobs.
The union is an in-house union affiliated to the Federation of Democratic Trade Unions.
Labor management relationship have been cordial, through an institutionalized labor
management cooperation scheme, and regular meetings with management once a week.
Grievances are small in number, averaging 5 per quarter. There has never been a strike in
Matsushita, which enjoys a very positive reputation as being a fair employer in the local region.
In terms of employment flexibility, the company uses a variety of practices including
cutting shifts, transfer of employees to other departments, and having workers schedule their
annual vacations during economic downturns. Although the company made extensive use of
casual and temporary workers, this has been a source of conflict with the union, and in 1993, at
least 1000 casual workers were regularized. There has been one retrenchment in 1984, where
40% of the employees were retrenched, but were rehired in 1986.
The bulk of Matsushita's expansion in Southeast Asia has gone to Malaysia, where it
has three large factories and is scheduled to invest more in higher end production in Malaysia in
1994. The Philippines operations do not see much potential for expansion.
ISI Sector Firms in Malaysia
Jotun Corro-Coat (JCC): JCC Malaysia was established as an associate of Jotun International
of Norway, a world leader in the manufacture and sale of powder coatings in the paint industry.
JCC Malaysia has been operating for 9 years, and the factory employs 120 workers. JCC is the
market leader for powdered paint in Malaysia, having been the only manufacturer in Malaysia
for seven years, and commands an impressive 75% of the market share. Three other powder
coatings manufacturers exist, all joint ventures with big international business houses. These
three competitors have between them 25% of the market. JCC, with its long standing reputation
for quality (technical assistance from Jotun International) and high market share does not view
the competition as a serious threat.
Given that powder coatings are superior to regular paint on account of it being
noncorrosive, non toxic, and lead free, it is the preferred paint used by electronic manufacturers,
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which has been the fastest growing and largest industry in Malaysia over the last decade. JCC
thus has faced a constantly expanding market for its products since its establishment (the
electronics industry has been growing in excess of 10 % per annum over the last 10 years. The
future for JCC looks bright, and all of its output is sold within Malaysia, although much of its
rawmaterials are imported. It is a key ISI industry. Faced with a stable economic environment,
Jotun management seems complacent about its future.
In terms of work organization, the job classifications are relatively rigid and workers have
little control over the machinery since their work is governed by machine cycles in the
continuous process technology that is used. However, monthly production targets are discussed
and agreed to with the local union, which is affiliated to the National Union of Petroleum and
Chemical Industry workers.
JCC's compensation strategy of being the best paymaster in the paint industry is closely
tied to its need to attract and retain skilled workers in a labor shortage economy. The
compensation system is simple, with defined scales, defined annual increments, and annual
bonuses irrespective of the financial performance of the plant. Merit based increases are also
given, although the quantum of such increases are specified in the collective bargaining
contract. The only flexible component of the pay system is a fixed production bonus based on
every additional ton of powder coatings produced over the negotiated workload (it was 300 tons
under this agreement). This bonus is rather meager, and paid by a voucher for 200 RM
redeemable at specified local supermarkets. In addition, there is an attendance incentive
scheme. The compensation system is therefore quite rigid, with management having little
flexibility to negotiate the rates of pay up or down and the bonus payment constitutes an
additional rigidity.
While most training is done OJT, technical skill development and computer skills are
taught outside in government training institutes and skill development centers. Job related skills
are the focus of the training and the company believes that workers are not capable of being
trained to attend to breakdowns in the highly complex and expensive machinery, which are
handled by maintenance engineers. The management however admits that there is an absence
of outside agencies that can help increase intellectual skills of its workers in the area.
Labor turnover at JCC has been rather low, less than 3% annually, which is something
of a record given the labor shortage of skilled operatives in Malaysia, but this is largely
attributed to the market leading compensation strategy adopted by JCC. Internal flexibility
requirements are met by the use of overtime. This permits maintenance of a leaner workforce
and providing workers with increased earning capacity. Working four hours overtime is routine.
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Industrial relations is collaborative, with significant safeguards in the contract against
retrenchment, although the management argues that retrenchment is a moot issue given that
demand for JCC's products have never decreased. The length of the current long term
agreement (40-50 pages of closely typed print) is unusual in Malaysian industry and a testament
to the bargaining power of the union. The agreement is specific regarding the co-
decision-making powers of the management and union in a number of specific areas and
issues, and promotions also form a subject of negotiation. In general, human resource practices
in JCC reflect considerable union influence in decision-making, and in relative terms, has
significant restrictions on employer discretion on many issues. The management suggests that
its privileged market position has allowed it to make concessions that it would otherwise not
have made to the union.
Perwira Habib Bank (PHB): A privately owned commercial bank, PHB is one of the largest
commercial banks in Malaysia, employing 50933 employees with 1125 branches. Given the
economic growth rates of Malaysia, PHB is experiencing a period of intensive growth, with the
number of branches increasing by 7% every year over the last six years. Profitability rates have
also showed steady increases, between 1991 and 1992, profitability per employee rose by 12%.
Given that the banking industry is heavily unionized in Malaysia, with separate unions for
clerical and junior officers (affiliated to the National Union of Bank Employees) and for officers
(affiliated to the Association of Bank Officers), most human resource management issues such
as compensation are common across the industry. The officers unions are pretty much in house
unions. Collective bargaining is centralized, with the two unions negotiating with the MCBA (The
Malaysian Commercial Banks Association). Each agreement is for a period of three years,
although the agreement does permit individual banks to sign separate memorandums of
understanding. Given that banks are defined as "essential industries", strikes are not permitted.
While compensation practices are common across all banks given the collective
bargaining agreement, there is considerable variation in training practices across banks. In
PHB, training is primarily done for skill enhancement and is provided on the job. Like all banks,
PHB also has its own banking school or training center, with a staff of 15 training officers.
Although the Malaysian central bank has promulgated rules mandating that each bank must
spend 2.5% of the annual wage and salary costs on employee training, PHB has consistently
exceeded that target, spending roughly 4.5% of its wage bill on training activities. Apart from the
mandated salary, PHB also provides an annual bonus of two month's pay, while the officers get
a profit sharing scheme.
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However, given that growth in manufacturing has been greater than the growth in the
service industry, the bank has been losing its lower level clerical employees to manufacturing
due to the higher salaries caused by labor shortages. Turnover rates of 5-6% annually are
common in the banking industry, a rate that is extremely high given the labor shortage in
Malaysia.
In terms of employment flexibility, the strong unionization does not permit layoffs or
retrenchments in case of economic down turns. In addition, given that the Malaysian central
bank will not allow any bank to go under, there is a level of complacency about human resource
and administrative costs that was not evident in the manufacturing industry. In case of economic
downturns, the banks response has been to lower administrative costs. Of late, there has been
a trend towards increased temporary employment during peak periods, but this is unlikely to
continue given the difficulty of getting people on account of the labor shortages in Malaysia. The
only long term response that increases flexibility is the trend in terms of increased automation in
the banking industry worldwide, and PHB is at the forefront of the automation movement in
Malaysia, having adopted an automated service center concept.
Labor relations in PHB has been cordial. There have been no strikes or industrial
disputes during the last five years. There is very little interaction between union and
management on a day to day basis, given that most negotiations are done on a central level.
EOI Sector Firms in Malaysia
MATTEL TOOLS: Mattel Tools is fully owned subsidiary of Mattel Inc, an American toy
manufacturer noted for its toys such as Barbie Dolls and other plastic toys. Mattel Tools, set up
7 years ago in Penang, makes plastic and diecast molds for toys. The escalation of labor costs
in Hong Kong, where Mattel has another tool and die factory has also brought increased
business to Mattel Tools in Malaysia. Production of casts and mould have increased steadily
from 480 in 1988 to about 550 in 1993.
The technology used in Mattel Tools is acclaimed as state of the art. CADCAM is used
to design patterns for molds. The mold pattern is made by highly skilled pattern makers, using
the latest grinding and milling equipment. All of the operations, whether it is cutting, grinding, or
bench-fitting are highly skilled jobs requiring intensive training and experience in tool and die
making.
Mattels' human resource policies reflect the need for attracting and retaining highly
skilled workers. In terms of training, the skills for the low end operations such as lathe milling
and grinding, are locally available. However, tool and die making skills have to be developed,
given the absence of skills in tool and die making in Malaysia. Given the high turnover (3-4X per
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month!) in skilled tool and die-makers (whose skills are required in almost every manufacturing
industry) continuous training is paramount, and shortages are met by importation of skilled
workers from India. Mattel runs its own training center and in collaboration with the Penang
Skills Development center, has instituted a five year technical training program for tool and die
makers, involving two years of schooling and three years on the job.
Mattel's compensation strategy is geared to retention of skilled workers, especially given
its high training costs in training tool and die makers. The compensation system is flexible, with
a fixed salary and annual increments tied to inflation, and a variable portion of pay based on as
series of production incentives and merit based incentives. Merit increases are also given at the
discretion of the management. In addition, there are a number of different incentive schemes.
Roughly 40% of total pay is flexible.
Flexibility is important, given that toys are a luxury good and therefore extremely
sensitive to changes in economic conditions. In order to enhance workplace flexibility, several
strategies are used. Apart from high levels of daily overtime (exceeding three hours every day),
the company makes extensive use of vocational trainees. These are industrial trainees under a
centralized apprenticeship program run by the government, where they are apprenticed to
industry for 10 months. These trainees get paid a small stipend but are used by the company to
do a lot of the low skill material handling work. At any given time there are 12-24 people at the
plant, which corresponds to more than 12.5% of the workforce. In periods of recession, the
trainees contracts are terminated.
Mattel also uses subcontracting extensively. About 30% of the total production is
subcontracted, both locally and internationally in India. Mattel has several vendor development
programs to develop subcontractors, which allow them to not only reduce costs of productions
(subcontractors production is roughly 1/3rd of Mattel's in house costs) but allows Mattel to
operate a JIT system that also reduces inventory carrying costs.
The employees are not unionized. Although one attempt was made five years ago,
management "cracked down" on the key workers, who were fired. Since then, there have not
been any unionization attempts, and the progressive personnel policies such as high wages,
very good benefits, and the creation of an open communications by a new personnel and
human resource development manager has contributed to increased cooperation between
management and workers. Mattel is a good example of a lean organization that follows a highly
flexible human resource management approach.
X Semiconductors: X semiconductor, a subsidiary of a well known European semiconductor
manufacturer, is one of the oldest foreign owned semiconductor firms in Malaysia, employs
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1000 employees, and is engaged in the assembly and testing of semiconductors. The firm has
recently expanded is operations in Malaysia, in large part due to the private sector and local
government cooperation in setting up the Penang Skills Development Center, which provides
training facilities, but also an opportunity for corporations to learn from each other and demand
the specific kind of training that they required. A market leader in the European market, its
manufacturing establishment in Malaysia demonstrates the state of the art in electronics
manufacturing, and its human resource policies reflect the high skills based production system
that is used.
Work organization is based on teamwork in a highly flexible production system. Each
operative is trained in several horizontal tasks consistent with the multiskilling policy of the
company. In terms of more vertical tasks, the worker not only solves production and minor
maintenance problems, but also sets up machinery, including programming the relevant
software, uses statistical quality control to monitor yield and inventory, and attempts process
improvements. In the teams, the team leader doubles up as the supervisor. Teams are largely
horizontal, although vertical teams are formed as and when the need arises. The compensation
strategy of the company is that of a market follower, and pays the market rates for operatives.
However, at least 40% of the compensation package is tied to skill acquisition, and both
individual and team based production incentives. Although annual wage increases based on the
cost of living are provided to everybody, merit determines increases above the increases in the
cost of living. The firm has a policy of multiskilling where each operative must know at least 4
different jobs to advance into the next level. Most training is done on the job, although workers
are sent for required courses at the Penang Skills development center. All operatives must
demonstrate competency in math and elementary statistics, as well as use of computers before
being confirmed in their jobs.
Although the plant has never been the target of a union organizing drive, there is regular
labor management communication through a labor-management consultation scheme. The
company shares financial information and operates a suggestion scheme, while workers are
involved in departmental production decisions. With the move to higher skill based production
the male female ratios and the age distribution of the employees have undergone changes.
Under the older Fordist production methods, 75% of the employees were female. According to
the personnel manager, employment of females was attractive as they tended to leave when
they got married. Given the new production systems require more highly skilled workers and the
supply of these skills are more highly concentrated amongst males, males now form 50% of the
workforce. In addition, the average tenure of workers is increasing along with decreases in
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turnover levels which now average 1-3% per month, down from 5% per month. There is a
greater emphasis on job security and the valuation of experience and skills under this
production system relative to the pre 1985 Fordist production system. The company has made a
serious effort over the last five years to increase its subcontracting network, which has been
facilitated by the Malaysian Government's promotion of linkages between small subcontractors
and the electronics industry. Most of the subcontracted work relate to simple labor intensive
operations, and comprise less than 10% of the total value of output of the company. Our
interviews with both management workers suggest that both production and human resource
management reflect the practices in the electronics industry in Penang, where most of the high
skill based electronics operations are located.
Y Televisions: This is a subsidiary unit of a large television manufacturer located in West
Malaysia. The unit is responsible for insertion of components into printed circuit boards used in
color television sets. This firm initially invested in Malaysia in its low cost export orientation
phase to take advantage of generous incentives offered by the government. It exports 75% of its
production to international markets in U.S. and Europe. Its decision to automate production was
in response to expanding markets and intense competition in the television manufacturing
industry that resulted in a decline of TV prices in the mid 1980s. The increasing labor shortages
in Malaysia also spurred its decision to computerize. In 1986, the company invested heavily in
automatic insertion machines to replace manual insertion of components.
The automated work process is done in the context of a work organization system that is
based on teamwork. Workers on the assembly line (young women) serve as machine feeders,
servicing the machine with boards and other components. Given that automation has freed up
operative time, the operator is also responsible for quality inspection. The team is headed by a
graduate computer programmer who gets the initial test run done and then functions as the
team leader or supervisor.
All operatives are trained in several different operations, including servicing the insertion
machines, inspection, and minor repairs. Some workers with higher educational qualifications,
are sent for training in basic computer skills, to operate Macintosh computers that are used to
set up the machine. Workers are trained in supervisory and personality development skills. The
compensation strategy of the company changed with the introduction of automation. Not only is
it the market leader, paying the best wages in the television manufacturing industry in Malaysiaiii
(Yun 1990), fixed wages form only 60% of the total compensation package, the balance being
accounted for by incentives tied to production (measured in terms of machine down time due to
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feeding problems, as well as total output, and quality measured by the percentage of rejects in
each run.
The firms benefits are also generous but are benchmarked against benefit plans in the
industry, which they closely follow. The firm primarily employs young women, and labor turnover
is high (6% per annum) as the women stop work after marriage. Of late, the company has
changed its recruitment policy to allow the rehiring of older married women on a part time basis.
The company is unionized, with a strong local union affiliated to a national industrial union in the
electrical industry. Wage increases and negotiations regarding the introduction of new
technology is invariably negotiated by national union leaders rather than local union leaders,
given the lack of expertise amongst the young women in negotiations. After 1986, three long
term contracts have been successfully negotiated without a strike. There is little or no
labor-management interaction on a regular basis, and the grievance system is used extremely
rarely. Workers suggest that most work related problems are solved at the supervisor level, after
the company introduced a pay system for supervisors that was tied to their ability to solve
worker grievances. There have been few grievances regarding issues not directly related to
work, and no grievances regarding pay and working conditions after 1986.
Flexibility needs are met by overtime. Yun (1990) who has also studied this plant, noted
that each employee works roughly four hours of overtime per day. Overtime accounts for up to
30% of workers' earnings per month. The constantly expanding international market has
ensured that there have been relatively few economic downturns, which was met by reduced
overtime. So far, no worker has been retrenched, and other external flexibility enhancing
methods have not been utilized. Company officials tell us that their work organization and
payment practices are standard in the industry, where there is considerable bench-marking
through the interactions of the personnel management association and local skills development
centers.
COMPARATIVE EVALUATIONS
These cases permit comparisons at several different levels. First, differences between
ISI and EOI sectors within each economy are discussed. Thereafter, differences and similarities
across the two countries are analyzed. The basic differences found in IR/HR practices are listed
on Tables 2 and 3.
-Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here-
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Within Country Comparisons
The ISI and EOI Sectors in Malaysia
Table 2 suggests several differences in IR/HR practices across the ISI and EOI sectors
in Malaysia. As Table 2 indicates, the two diverse firms in the ISI sector, JCC and PHB Bank,
are characterized by rigid job classifications, rigid pay systems, simple on the job training
methods, profess to have no layoff policies, and meet their flexibility requirements primarily
through the use of overtime. Labor management relationships are generally cooperative, and
human resource practices tend to reflect rigidity and complacency. Although these two firms are
in different sectors exhibit similarities, note that they are in different industrial and economic
sectors, use differing technology and work organization methods, and employ different kinds of
employees (Blue -collar vs. white collar). Apart from similar approaches to IR/HR practices, the
only other critical similarity is that both firms face stable economic environments given the
rapidly growing Malaysian economy, and both firms face domestic competition that is not
threatening.
In sharp contrast to the ISI sector, the patterns of IR/HR practices in the EOI sector are
different. All the firms are export oriented units servicing international markets. Although they
are in different industries using different technologies, work organization is largely based on
teamwork operations which emphasize multi-skil ed workers and flexible compensation
arrangements that enhance skill acquisition and development. As Table 3 suggests, these firms
tend to make more use of subcontracting arrangements to enhance external flexibility, and
some of them use temporary and casual workers and apprentices. Three out of four firms here
are non union and have attempted to avoid unionization, while labor management relations in
the unionized television firm are collaborative. In Malaysia, clearly, human resource and
industrial relations practices in the EOI sector are far more flexible and aggressive than those of
the firms in the ISI sector.
The ISI and EOI Sectors in the Philippines
The general differences noted between ISI and EOI sectors in Malaysia are apparent in
the Philippines as well, although the EOI sector shows a greater diversity of IR/HR practices
than in Malaysia. In the ISI sector, both In erbank and Dutchboy paints evidence some degree
of complacency and paternalism in their personnel practices. Both companies are characterized
by relatively rigid job classifications with only vertical movement, both firms have on the job
training policies with no policy on multiskilling, both have rigid compensation systems that pay
above the market, both companies are unionized, have no layoff policies, and respond to
external and internal flexibility needs through the use of overtime reduction and automation.
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Industrial relations are largely cooperative, and in the case of DutchBoy Paints, even
paternalistic.
The firms in the EOI sector evidence different patterns of IR/HR practices from those in
the ISI sector, although the patterns are more variegated in the EOI sector. In general however,
the emphasis on flexibility in wages, the focus on skills development, and teamwork is evident in
these firms (see Table 3). However, as noted, IR/HR practices exhibit more variance in the EOI
sector than in the Malaysian case. Uniden's IR/HR policies that reflects its low cost orientation
characterized by assembly line operations with Fordist work practices, a rigid compensation
system that pays barely above the minimum wage in the Philippines, uses extensive casual and
contract labor, does not adopt a multiskilling policy, and adopts union suppression strategies.
On the other hand, MOTOROLA is characterized by a work organization that is based on
teamwork, extensive multiskilling, flexible wage systems, progressive personnel policies in a
nonunion environment, including work sharing and no layoffs in economic downturns.
Matsushita's practices are more similar to those of Motorola rather than UNIDEN although
Matsushita is unionized. Citibank, with its teamwork emphasis (unique in the Filipino banking
industry), compensation systems tied to skill acquisition, the extensive use of subcontracting,
and a more conflictual industrial relations system reflects an aggressive approach to IR/HR that
are not seen in the banks in the ISI sector.
Across Country Comparisons
Sector and Firm Comparisons
Comparisons across the two countries tend to confirm the pattern of IR/HR policy
differences noted within each country. Examination of Tables 2 and 3, suggest the firms in the
ISI sectors in both countries, i.e., two banking firms Interbank (Philippines) and PHB Bank
(Malaysia) and the two paint companies, Dutch Boy (Philippines) and JCC (Malaysia) evidence
similarities in the IR/HR strategies. For instance, in the banking industry, both banks are
unionized, have rigid job classifications, simple training systems, and rigid compensation
practices. Both banks appear to follow industry level wage practices as a result of industry wide
bargaining, although Interbank pays above the market in the Filipino banking industry. In the
paint industry, despite vastly different market conditions faced by the two paint manufacturers
(Dutchboy is losing market share to competition, while JCC maintains its market share), their
IR/HR practices are remarkably similar. Both firms have relatively rigid classifications and
compensation systems, simple on the job based training without multiskilling, collaborative
union management relations, with generous benefit policies and a no layoff system.
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IR/HR practices in the EOI sectors in both countries also evidence similarities. For
instance, in case of electronics firms, Matsushita and Motorola in the Philippines evidence
similar IR/HR practices to X semiconductor and Y televisions in Malaysia, all of them having
team based production systems, compensation linked to skill acquisition, flexible compensation
systems, broad based training, and an aggressive attitude towards workplace flexibility through
the use of subcontracting and casual labor. Outside of the electronics sector, Mattel tools in
Malaysia, and Citibank in the Philippines also evidence active and aggressive human resource
management practices, with an emphasis towards highly flexible practices (see Table 2 and 3).
The central differences between IR/HR practices in the ISI and EOI sectors in both
countries appear to be found with respect to compensation policies, work organization,
multiskilling, internal flexibility arrangements and unionization. The constructs underlying these
practices are those of flexibility and productivity enhancement. Firms under an EOI sector
appear to place a greater emphasis on flexible human resource practices.
Given that Malaysia and the Philippines are following different EOI strategies, (Malaysia
follows an advanced EOI strategy while Philippines follows a simple first stage EOI strategy) it
was expected that there would be some differences in the IR/HR patterns in the EOI sector in
both countries. This difference is best exemplified in the comparison of IR/HR practices of a
Philippine electronics firm, Uniden, with the policies of electronics firms in Malaysia. UNIDEN's
policies reflect a low cost orientation, given its low wage strategy, no multi-training, Fordist work
organization and conflictual employee relations, while Malaysian electronics firms evidence a
higher skill based and more flexible, progressive IR/HR policies. Admittedly, both Motorola and
Matsushita in the Philippines also evidence progressive IR/HR policies and are notable
exceptions to the argument. However, as noted by Pineda-Ofreneo and Ofreneo 1994)
Matsushita and Motorola are exceptions to the standard of electronics manufacturers in the
Philippines, given that most Philippine electronics firms are more similar to Uniden.
The difference between Malaysian and Philippine electronics firms found here is
consistent with other findings regarding the international division of labor in the Southeast Asian
electronics industry, noted by Allen (1990) and others (Lai 1992, Rajah 1993, Salih, Young, and
Rajah 1988) who have suggested that firms locate the lowest end of their production such as
assembly and testing, in the Philippines, and higher end processes such as wafer fabrication
and design of chips in Malaysia. Motorola for instance has three factories in Malaysia and has
transferred R&D there as early as 1986, while it has not done so in the Philippines. Matsushita's
Malaysian operations dwarf its Philippine operations in scope, and size, with three plants and
more investment slated for 1994.
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A study by the Board of Investments for the Department of Trade and Industry in the
Philippines suggests that Philippine electronics firms typically concentrate on "the assembly,
testing and packaging of semi-conductors, representing the most labor intensive stage, and
involves nothing more than the cutting of silicon wafers into separate dies and their individual
encapsulation using plastic ceramic or metal cans as casing materials" (ESP 2000: 51). The
Malaysian electronics industry, which focused on assembly and testing in the early 1980s, is
now characterized by higher end processes and final testing, as well as research and
development. In a recent study of work organization and human resource practices in the
electronics industry in Malaysia, Rajah (1994: 22-24) suggests "work boundaries have
expanded--team work and collective responsibility have become more important-- a wider set of
skills, including SQC and computer operations are now required-- and wages are higher and
tied to skill acquisition".
Clearly, the cases in this paper provide some support to the proposition that IR/HR
practices in the Malaysian EOI sector are perhaps more "advanced", but certainly different to
the norm in the low cost EOI sector in the Philippines.
Discussion
The argument in this paper was that the dominant industrialization strategies of both
countries influences the growth of different patterns of IR/HR policies and practices in economic
sectors that are created by the industrialization strategy. The comparisons suggest three
conclusions. First, there are differences in IR/HR practices between the ISI and EOI sectors in
each country. In the ISI sector, firms appear to be following more "passive" human resource
practices. In the EOI sector, in both countries, the human resource practices appear to evidence
more diversity, but suggests a general pattern of more "aggressive" and flexible IR/HR
practices, that appear to fit the pattern of "new human resource systems" alluded to by many
authors. Second, these differences are apparent in both countries. Third, the IR/HR practices
under a more advanced EOI strategy in Malaysia differ from the IR/HR practices in first stage
EOI in the Philippines, which is best exemplified by the electronics industry, which constitutes
the bulk of the EOI sector in both countries.
Although I focus on the industrialization strategy to explain the differing IR/HR practices
in the two sectors, there can be other explanation for the differences noted above. One
explanation is the role of technology in shaping human resource and industrial relations
practices. It can be argued for instance, that work organization in the paint industry cannot be
team based since it uses continuous process technology, providing little opportunity for team
based production. While this is certainly true, it does not explain the other rigid and paternalistic
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practices found in the paint industry and banks in the ISI sector in both countries. In the banking
example, note that while both ISI banks had relatively rigid practices, Citibank in the EOI sector
pursued a more flexible strategy. The technology based explanation therefore, does not fully
explain the patterns noted above. .
A second alternative explanation for the differences between EOI and ISI sectors
concerns the differences between domestic and foreign management. The argument is that
firms in the EOI sectors are foreign owned, and they transfer IR/HR management practices from
abroad to both Malaysia and the Philippines. This explanation is supported by some of the
cases. Clearly, in the Philippines, Citibank, Motorola, and Matsushita have introduced in these
countries the human resource management practices used in their worldwide operations. Note
however, that even domestic paint manufacturers like JCC and Dutch Boy are owned partly by
foreign interests, with substantial technological collaboration with a variety of foreign firms. Note
also that Interbank in the ISI sector is a subsidiary of American Express. Clearly, foreign
managements bring with them their own industrial relations and human resource innovations.
However, there is enough evidence in this paper to suggest that there is a generalized pattern
of ISI-EOI sector IR/HR differences that cannot be solely explained by the foreign management
explanation.
I therefore conclude that the differences in patterns of industrial relations and human
resource policies between ISI and EOI sectors in both countries are due to the industrialization
strategy that is followed. The pattern of differences appear to mirror the differences in the
competitive environment faced by the firms. The simple difference is that firms in the EOI sector
have to compete in the international market, and are subject to changes in the global economic
environment that is more volatile than the domestic environment that ISI firms face.
These differences are also exacerbated due to the different rules that EOI firms and ISI
firms face. For instance, it can be argued that the EOI sector in Malaysia is largely nonunion,
given a government policy that until 1988 prohibited unionization in the electronics and export
sectors in Malaysia, and even after the ban on unionization was lifted, labor laws that allow
employers to pursue union avoidance policies continue to exist. Similarly, government policies
in Malaysia have encouraged the development of local subcontractors for the export oriented
firms, through the provision of capital and technological assistance as part of its industrial
development policy, thus facilitating the extensive use of subcontracting in the EOI sector in
Malaysia. In the Philippines, a subcontracting exchange for the EOI sector has recently been
adopted (Ofreneo 1994), and as the cases suggest there is extensive use of temporary and
casual labor in the EOI sector that is not apparent in the ISI sector in the Philippines.
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Since Malaysia is at the stage of advanced EOI based on high skills, while the
Philippines is at the stage of simple EOI with cheap labor as the competitive advantage, the
incentives under the EOI strategy are structured around these competitive positions, and hence
explains why higher technology investment flows into Malaysia relative to the Philippines,
resulting in different patterns of IR/HR practices in the EOI sectors.
The findings in this paper suggest that different patterns of workplace level IR/HR
practices are found under different industrialization strategies, and is consistent with the finding
that industrialization strategies and national level IR/HR practices are closely inter-related
(Kuruvilla 1994). The use of the industrialization strategy framework in explaining IR/HR
practices permits researchers to go beyond traditional sectoral differences such as
manufacturing or services", "blue collar and white collar" to sectors such as ISI and EOI that
include both blue and white collar firms as well as manufacturing and service firms. The
framework thus provides comparative researchers with a different unit of analysis in examining
patterns of IR/HR practices.
However, the relatively small number of cases does not permit easy generalization. A
wider range of firms need to be sampled to make that generalization. Future research may wish
to address this issue by extending this type of analysis to more firms in both sectors and to
other countries in Asia, where the development strategies have been similar. Given the
increasingly widespread acceptance of the Asian model as a development model for the third
world, opportunities for this kind of investigation abound.
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Table 1 : Outcomes of Industrialization Strategies
Economic Growth Ratesa
   Year Malaysia Philippines
1971-75 7.2  5.7
1976-80 8.6  6.0
1981-85 5.2 -1.2
1986-90 6.1  5.1
Contribution of Sectors to GDP (percent)b
Malaysia Philippines
                   Agriculture    Industry     Services     Agriculture     Industry         Services
1960 33.8 7.2 20.4 27.1 15.2       29
1970 28.8 14.7 22.7 27.0 22.6 32.6
1980 22.9 19.6 22.4 28.8 25.7 26.2
1990 18.7 26.7 22.9 24.6 25.5 30.7
Contribution of Manufacturing to Total Export Earnings 1970-1990 (percent)c
Country    1970      1974        1977 1980    1984      1987         1990
Malaysia               7.4       13.6         15.4        19.0       26.7        39.5   3.9
Philippines            7.6       12.9         24.9        36.8       55.1        61.8 61.8
Foreign Firms Share in Manufacturing (percent)d
Country Employment Fixed Assets Sales Exports
Malaysia 49 32 45 60
Philippines - 32 41 66
____________________________________________________________________________
Sources:
a World Bank Tables, 1992
b World Bank Tables, 1992
c World Bank Tables, 1992
d National Statistics, Various Issues
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TABLE 2. IR/HR PRACTICES OF FIRMS IN MALAYSIA
IR/HR ISI Sector EOI Sector
PRACTICES
JOTUN PERWIRA HABIB COMPANY X MATTEL COMPANY Y
PAINTS BANK SEMICONDUCTOR TOOLS TELEVISIONS
BUSINESS Manufacture of paints for
domestic market
Domestic banking Export of electronic
components
Export of molds for toysExport of
television
components
WORK - Continuous process - Clerical operations - Automated - Automated design - Automated
ORGANIZATION AND
TECHNOLOGY
   technology
- Rigid job
  classifications
- Rigid job
  classifications
  assembly line
- Team based work
   systems
  and manufacture
  with highly skilled
  individual processes
  assembly line
  with horizontal
  work teams
TRAINING FOR - OJT for job specific - OJT for job specific - OJT - OJT - OJT
OPERATORS   skills   skills - Multiskilling - Training in - Multi-
- Teamwork training   maintenance   skilling
- Computer training - External training - Computer
- SQC training   in tool and die-    training
  making - SQC training
- Personality
  development
COMPENSATION - Market leader - Market follower - Market follower - Market follower - Market
STRATEGY - Rigid system with - Industry level - Highly flexible - Highly flexible   follower
  production bonuses   wage bargaining   pay tied to   pay with - Flexible Pay
- Rigid pay system   productivity and   incentives - Incentives
  with guaranteed   skills development   (Incentives form   for skill
  bonuses   40% of total salary)   development
WORKPLACE - No layoff policy - No layoff policy - Regular overtime - Regular overtime - Overtime
FLEXIBILITY - Overtime when - No overtime policy - Extensive use of - Extensive use of - Subcontracting
  necessary - Use of temporary   subcontracting   temporary labor
  labor in peak - No layoff policy
  periods - Subcontracting
LABOR Cooperative Cooperative Nonunion with Nonunion with Cooperative with
MANAGEMENT progressive HR progressive HR progressive
RELATIONS policies policies HR policies
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TABLE 3. IR/HR PRACTICES OF FIRMS IN PHILIPPINES
IR/HR ISI Sector EOI Sector
PRACTICES
DUTCHBOY INTERBANK CITIBANK UNIDEN MOTOROLA       MATSUSHITA
PAINTS
BUSINESS Manufacture of Domestic savings Foreign exchangeExport of circuit boardsExport of electronic Export of electronic
paints for bank bank products products
domestic market
WORK - Continuous - Rigid job - Flexible job - Manual assembly - Fully automated - Semiautomated
ORGANIZATION   process   classifications   classifications   line   processes   assembly line
AND - Rigid job - Group work - Rigid classifications - Highly flexible - Fixed job
TECHNOLOGY   classifications - Fordist work
  organization
  job classifications
- Semi and fully
  autonomous teams
  classifications with
  horizontal teams
TRAINING FOR - OJT for job - OJT for job - Job rotation - OJT for job specific - Job rotation - Job rotation
OPERATORS   specific skills   specific skills - Multiskilling   skills. - External team training- People skills
- No job rotation or - No job rotation   policy - No multiskilling - Skills development
  multiskilling policy  or multiskilling   policy   policy
  policy - Incentives for education
COMPENSATION
STRATEGY
- Market leader
- Rigid but generous
  compensation
  system
- Market leader
- Rigid pay system
  with guaranteed
  bonuses
- Market follower
- Flexible
  compensation
  partly tied to skill
  acquisition
-Market follower
- Compensation system
  rigid with no incentives
- 40% employees paid
  lower than minimum
- Market leader
- Highly flexible pay
  system tied to skill
  acquisition
- Market follower
- Skill based system
  with productivity
   incentives
WORKPLACE - No layoff policy - No layoff policy - Subcontracting - Extensive use of - No layoff policy - Extensive use of
FLEXIBILITY - Overtime when - Increased - Overtime   subcontracting and - Worksharing   temporary labor,
  necessary   automation   temporary labor   overtime, and
  subcontracting
LABOR Paternalistic and Cooperative Conflictual Nonunion with Nonunion with Unionized with
MANAGEMENT Cooperative aggressive union progressive HR cooperative
RELATIONS suppression policies labor-management
strategies relations
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Endnotes
                                                 
i Two well known comparative studies in industrial relations using pair-wise comparisons are
that of Dore (1973) who compared Britain and Japan, and the Aixen-Provence group (Maurice,
Sellier, and Silvestre 1986) who compare France and Germany.
ii The notion that there is a clearly defined development pathway in Asia is not new.  Deyo
(1989) alludes to the similarity of the export oriented economies of Korea.  Taiwan, Hong Kong,
and Singapore.  Kuruvilla (1994) suggests the similarity of export oriented strategies in several
Asian countries including the acceptance of this strategy in emerging nations such as
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.  More systematic comparisons of export oriented policies and
incentives (see Limequo et al) and similarities in economic transformations (see Kuruvilla and
Pagnucco 1994) also strongly suggest the presence of a typical development model.
iii This company has also been studied rather exclusively by Yun (1990), and this case study
draws extensively from her work.
